The Blag Switch

For some weeks, my good friends Trevor and Molly have been talking about getting a gun or two.  They’re newlyweds and have been thinking that having a gun for home protection might not be a bad idea.  Trevor decided that, for his part, he really wanted a shotgun, which for home defense is a superb choice.  Molly’s looking into something more in the handgun area, but in the meantime, Trevor decided that a scatter gun was in his future. So today, we met up at the White Elephant (a local sporting-goods/toy store) and, after I explained the principles between the different sorts of shotguns, we slung a few around to see if there were any he liked the feel of.

Finding the selection somewhat lacking, we shuffled our way a few blocks up the street to ARC, Inc.  Now ARC is by far and away my favorite gunstore in town.  It’s the local EBR/”Exotics” store, and it’s not unusual to find the walls adorned with AR-15s, M4geries, AKs, grenade launchers, etc.  (They’re also the best place in Eastern Washington to get a silencer, if you’re in the market.)  So it’s pretty hit-or-miss, and so I wasn’t expecting to find anything that was quite what Trevor was looking for. Fortunately, I was wrong.  In a place of honor on the wall they had a brand new Mossberg 590, with a full-length (7 round) tubular magazine and all-black furniture.  Trevor gave it a look, gave it a heft, and was sold.  After filling out the paper work and waiting for the ATF call-in, we through the gun and a couple of boxes of slugs into his car and off we went to the Spokane Rifle Club.

All I can say is: I suddenly regret that moritorium I put on buying any more guns for awhile.  After putting some hefty 73 caliber slugs down range, I suddenly got a huge itch for a smooth bore.  I don’t own any shotguns, and Trevor’s Mossberg convinced me in about 7 rounds that I’m pretty sure I need one. As for Trevor?  He’s extremely happy with his investment:

Within two boxes, all of Trevor’s slugs were landing within bad-guy-of-angle (the only really meaningful goal for a defensive gun) at 15 yards.  Next step for him?  The Defensive Shotgun course over at Sharpshooters. One more responsible, armed, (soon to be very well-trained) American citizen.

*N. B. - The following is an off-handed rant and will likely include some arguments that may be made in a less-than-clear fashion.  This is a topic which is of intense interest to me so PLEASE post any questions, comments, or arguments (pro or contra) in the comments.*

In his book Language, Truth, and Logic, the British philosopher A. J. Ayer puts puts forth a modified version of the weak verifiability thesis.  Essentially, Ayer says that any statement about which empirical evidence cannot be gathered and which is not a tautology is nonsense. In other words, there are three classes of statements: 1.) Statements of fact (i. e. statements about which evidence can be gathered via sense data).  2.) Tautologies (i. e. statements which denote equality of two things or concepts).  3.) Nonsensical statements which may be grammatically correct, but don’t actually signify anything.

After explicating his thesis (of which I’ve given only a very brief description here), Ayer goes on to use as a switch to woodshed a bunch of popular metaphysical notions.  Monism versus Pluralism?  Both positions are senseless because they can’t be empirically verified or refuted.  Realism versus Idealism?  Neither position is wrong because both are nonsense.

Where I begin to quibble with Ayer, however, is that he tries to tar questions of ontology with the same brush as the rest of metaphysics.  In essence he says that statements about the nature of Being (he capitalizes it in his book, possibly to take a swipe at Heidegger) are inherently senseless since no experiential evidence could possibly support or refute them.  This position to me seem specious.  At first blush, if, as he’s claiming, all metaphysics is comprised of non-sensical statements, then so too must be ontology.  And he makes a compelling argument regarding other metaphysical issues.  I would argue though that questions of being are of a substantially different kind then, say, questions of substance.

Take, for instance, Heidegger’s work on the relationship between Dasein (i. e. that being for which its own being is an issue) and time.  Heidegger argues that time is the horizon of being and reality and that without it, the sort of being that we, as human beings have, would be impossible.  While Ayer might be quick to point out that simply proving this logically from axioms is useless if the axioms are incorrect, I would argue that even working with Ayer’s own tools, such ontological claims can be evaluated.  We can find sense data to support or refute ontological claims like the one Heidegger is making.

Take, for instance, motion.  Motion invariably has two components, a locative and a temporal component.  Without either the experience of motion would be impossible.  Human beings experience motion.  This tells us two seemingly trivial but exceptionally vital things: namely that place and time are real, meaningful concepts with ties to the world of our experiences.

That we experience motion, then, is a piece of evidence (a necessary piece, though certainly not sufficient) which pertains to Heidegger’s comments regarding Being.  This means that we can gather evidence in support or refutation of Heidegger’s ontology.  Therefore, by Ayer’s own version of the verifiability principle, Heidegger’s ontology isn’t the nonsense that Ayer wants to claim it is, but rather an empirical, evaluatable statement about the world.

This, at least to me, shows that Ayer is wrong on at least some Ontological claims.